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TRIPS Agreement mandates adequate and effective protection for all inventions regardless of the field of technology.
The fundamental questions are whether the extent of protection of pharmaceuticals will be beneficial for the socio-economic
development of developing countries and how can the impact of the new system be monitored and controlled in the interests
of the concerned countries and their populations. Under the Thai Patent Law, Section 46.50 provides for the grant of
compulsory licenses, which in practical terms are difficult to implement so much so that no such licenses have been granted
since 1979 when the Act came into force. Lack of know-how to work the patent in Thailand has also been a serious
deterrent. Provision of a requirement for working of patented inventions is also part of the Thai Act. Section 36(2) of the
Thai Patent Law authorizes parallel imports into Thailand if the products are marketed abroad by the patentee or his
licensee. Section 9 (4) of the Act adopts the principle that methods of treatment are not patentable. Section 31 permits
opposition to be filed after the application is published by the Patent Office. The implication of TRIPS and the Thai Patent
Act on the pharmaceutical sector and on the patients in Thailand are discussed in this paper.
Keywords: TRIPS, Thai Patent Act, compulsory license, parallel imports, international exhaustion

The pressure pushed by the developed nations in the
late 1980s led to signing on to the international
agreement on intellectual property rights, TRIPS,
which is now part of the World Trade Organization
(WTO)’s multilateral agreements. The TRIPS
Agreement demands for adequate and effective
worldwide protection of all fields of technology,
including pharmaceutical products, and for effective
enforcement of patent rights throughout the world.
Two crucial questions are worth examining: (1) is the
extent of patent protection to pharmaceuticals of any
advantage to the long-term improvement of standards
of living and the provision of health care of the people
in the developing countries; and (2) how could the
profound impacts derived from patents be effectively
controlled? While existing socio-economic research
provides rich multi-disciplinary data on impacts of
patents on pharmaceuticals,1 this paper deals with the
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second issue. It surveys established principles of the
present patent rules with direct reference to
pharmaceutical inventions. It discusses various legal
problems relating to the use of non-voluntary
licensing scheme and other measures aimed to
minimize negative effects of pharmaceutical patents
and to increase access to essential medicines.
The Nature of Patents
It is interesting to note that the historical
development of the patent system is a long one. The
first patent Statute was enacted by the Venetian State
in 1474.2 It is, however, evident that an exclusive
monopoly had been granted to traders or inventors as
early as 500 BC.3
In England, the Crown issued monopoly right in the
form of ‘letters patent’ for the first time in 1331 to
foreigners who wished to practice their craft in the
country. That was the grant of monopoly privileges by
King Edward III to Johannes Kempe of Flanders for
the introduction of the textile industry to England.4
Letters patent conferred exclusive rights on such
persons to sell a product or to use a process for a
certain period of time. The introduction of the patent
system was for the encouragement of transferring new
technologies and establishment of new industries on a
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national scale. The monopoly rights were provided on
condition that the holder must work his imported
invention in the country for a specific time and the
patentee must teach the invention to others.5
Subsequently, the monopoly right was abused, as
kings granted monopolies to favoured people who
kept the prices of the commodities higher than they
would normally have been. Because of the Crown’s
abuse of the royal prerogative and its use of patents as
a source of patronage and revenue, but not to
encourage invention, the Statute of Monopolies of
1623 was enacted in order to curb the royal ability to
grant privileges and to abolish the unjustified
monopoly power that was affecting free trade and
competition in the country.
The Statute of Monopolies or the so-called ‘Magna
Carta of the rights of inventors’6 is regarded as a
landmark of the modern patent system. Section 6 of
the Statute effectively stopped the monopoly power
by prohibiting monopoly practices and declared all
monopolies void. However, patent monopolies
granted by the monarch were exceptionally excluded
for fourteen years. The Statute recognized the right of
the ‘true and first inventor’7 and established for the
first time in history, the requirement imposed higher
public interest for the grant of a patent, and limitation
in time of the exclusive privileges.8
In the early stage of the English patent system, the
patent holder had obligations to introduce trade and to
teach details of his invention to indigenous tradesmen.
Until the early eighteenth century, condition for
disclosure changed from the work of the invention to
disclosure in a documentary form. The inventor in
exchange for a patent had to describe all details and
manner of his invention in a specification.9
Compulsory Licensing and Local Working
Requirement
The concept of the modern patent system is based
on reciprocity as used in the Statute of Monopolies.
Patent is an instrument that compromises private and
public interests. The State confers monopolistic
proprietary privileges to an inventor, and in return the
inventor provides adequate public disclosure of new
knowledge and carries out local working of patented
technology which will assist national economic
development. A compulsory licence can be used by
the State to achieve that economic goal. It authorizes
the licensee to perform acts covered by the patent

exclusive rights (e.g. manufacturing, selling or
importing the patented product). The compulsory
licence can be granted on various grounds including
non-working of patent.
International Rules

Local working requirements, which have been a
fixture of many countries’ national patent law, are the
primary means for effecting the goal of technology
acquisition and promotion of economic development.
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property does not explicitly stipulate that patents must
be effectively exploited in the granting State, but
states in Article 5A(2) and (3) that each member has a
right to adopt legislative measures (i.e. compulsory
licensing and revocation or forfeiture) to prevent
abuses of patent exclusive rights (e.g. failure to work).
The TRIPS Agreement seems to prohibit the
imposition of local working as Article 27.1 requires
equal treatment for both imported and locallymanufactured products.10 However, it has been argued
that TRIPS does not totally ban local working. The
patent-granting country can still impose working
obligations in accordance with Article 5A of the Paris
Convention.11 Since Article 27.1 is a provision
containing general rules of patentability, it is subject
to specific rules under Article 28 (rights conferred)
and Article 31 (other use without authorization of the
right holder) of the TRIPS Agreement, and possibly
Article 5A of the Paris Convention which is
incorporated into TRIPS through Article 2.1 of the
TRIPS Agreement.12 According to a general rule of
treaty interpretation under Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, when general principles are in
conflict with a specific provision, the specific rules
shall take precedent.
This view is shared by prominent science and
technology expert, Carlos Correa, who contends that
the Article 27.1 text must be read in conjunction with
Article 28.1, and that the requirement of nondiscriminatory treatment will apply to infringing
products only, not the products coming from the
patent owner. According to him, the provision
“forbids discrimination between infringing
imported and infringing locally-made products, but it
does not rule out the establishment of differential
obligations with regard to non-infringing imported
and locally-made products (i.e. products made or
imported by the patent owner or with his/her
consent).”11
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If this interpretation is correct, the working of a
patent through local production of goods can be
legitimately required by WTO Members. It is
interesting to note that patent laws of most developed
countries still continue to regard the local working
obligation as an essential element to balance the
patent system.11 Accession to WTO/TRIPS
Agreement has not led those countries to repeal their
local working provisions.
Thai Law

Compulsory licensing for local working is
stipulated in Sections 46-50 of the current law of
Thailand, the Patent Act B.E. 2522. Thai law
regards non-working of a patent as an abuse. The
law considers a patent not being worked in two
particular circumstances: (1) when a patented
product has not been produced or the patented
process has not been applied for manufacture in
Thailand, and (2) when the patentee refuses to
sell the products protected by the patent, in the
Thai market, in sufficient quantity, or when such
products are sold at an excessive price.
Importation is not considered ‘working’ of a
patent. A patentee has an obligation not only to
produce and sell the patented articles within the
country, but also to work it at a level, or a
substantial amount, sufficient to fulfil the Thai
demand for the patented articles.
In one of the above situations, anybody can apply
for a compulsory licence from the Department of
Intellectual Property (DIP) to work the invention, but
in return he has to pay a royalty to the patentee.13 The
person seeking a compulsory licence must submit an
application to the Director-General of the DIP
claiming that a request for authorization to use the
invention on reasonable terms and an appropriate
amount of royalty had been made by him to the
patentee, but no agreement was concluded with the
patentee within a reasonable period of time.14
The applicant has to show that, within the specified
time, the patented product has not been produced, or
the patented process has not been applied, in the
country without any legitimate reason, or no product
produced under the patent is sold in the domestic
market, or that such a product is sold but at an
unreasonably high price, or does not meet the
public demand without any legitimate reason.15 This
provision implies that the burden of proof of
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non-working rests with the applicant rather than with
the patentee. This constitutes a reversal of patent
principle. As generally recognized, an obligation to
work the invention is placed on the right holder. If
there is no working, he should have a duty to present
evidence to justify his inaction.16 This reversal makes
the Thai compulsory licensing system impractical, as
the applicant has almost no chance of determining
whether the patentee has a legitimate reason or not in
not working the invention.
Section 46 of the Patent Act B.E. 2522 provides
that an application for a compulsory licence can be
made after the expiration of three years from the date
the patent is issued, or four years from the filing date,
whichever period expires last. This condition, which
is drawn from Article 5A(4) of the Paris Convention,
aims to provide sufficient time for the patentee to
exploit his invention, but may not be sufficiently
beneficial to protect the public interests. The period of
time to obtain a compulsory licence by a third party is
likely to be much longer than the time stipulated, as
necessarily prior examination with respect to the
requirements of patentability may take a long time,17
especially in developing nations which lack staff and
a systematic arrangement for patent examination. For
example, the period of patent granting in Thailand is,
on the average, three to four years. Since a
compulsory licence cannot be issued during this
period including another three year from the date of
the grant of the patent, compulsory licensing
procedure may be able to commence only after seven
years from the time of filing the patent.18
Further, in cases where compulsory licensing
application is under consideration of the courts rather
than the administration, the procedure will definitely
last longer.19 Moreover, the patentee may resist or
delay the grant of a compulsory licence by entering
into a voluntary licence with one of its subsidiaries.
The time lag, therefore, might act as an obstacle to an
attempt by the patent granting country to use the
compulsory licensing to safeguard public interests.
Appraisal

An examination at the DIP found no application for
a compulsory licence being filed, and no single
licence has been granted since the Patent Act entered
into force in 1979. Apart from the complex granting
procedure, there are three possible reasons why use of
the system is so minimal in most developing
countries. One is the lack of necessary know-how
essential for the commercial working of patents.
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Another reason may be the long period which a third
party has to wait to apply for a compulsory licence.
After the three or four-year period (unquestionably
two or three more years from the filing date as
discussed above), the technology relating to the
patented invention, particularly those in rapidly
evolving sectors, might have been considerably
improved upon, and may become obsolete and
irrelevant. Lastly, patent systems of most developing
nations adopt the principle of compulsory licensing
enshrined in the Paris Convention and the TRIPS
Agreement. It is ironic that those nations are equally
unwilling to occasional use of patent. The real
difficulty may stem from political difficulties rather
than economic or technical reasons.

emergencies, defence and public needs such as
healthcare, environment and other matters of
necessity.22 A government use provision covers all
uses of a patent by the State for either public noncommercial or commercial purposes. It may be made
directly by the relevant government agency, or
indirectly by any authorized body. The State
exercising government use, however, must respect a
number of conditions contained in TRIPS Article 31.
Conditions for Non-Voluntary Government Use Licensing

Under Thai law, Section 51 of the Patent Act B.E.
2522 provides for a government use licence. It lays
down procedural and substantive rules to be fulfilled
prior to exercising the government use licensing,
including the following conditions:

Government Use Licence
Use of Patent for Public Interests

Grounds and Requirement for Consultation

The non-voluntary licensing for government use
derived from ‘Crown use’ under English common
law. By granting monopolistic patent rights, the
Crown reserved the right to use patented inventions
without the consent of or paying compensation to the
patent holder.20 The government use provision is
considered necessary and in the larger public interest,
and incidental to sovereign powers and functions of
the State.
The Paris Convention does not specifically mention
the government use. The non-voluntary government
use is not subject to the requirements prescribed by
Article 5A(4), which are applicable to abuses of
patent rights such as failure to work or insufficient
working. The powers of State to use the patented
invention remain unaffected even after TRIPS
enforcement. Articles 7, 8 and 31 of the TRIPS
Agreement clearly intend to extend the social benefits
of patents to other areas than the provisions of the
Paris Convention. The Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health21 reaffirms that
each country has the right to determine what
constitutes a ground for government use such as
national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency.
Like the local working requirement, the
government use provision can be found in the law of
many countries, including United States patent law
(35 USC 181; 28 USC 1498), United Kingdom
Patents Act 1977 (Sections 55-59), etc. Countries,
both developed and developing, implement such
powers in the widest terms to cover all possibilities,
particularly those involving national security,

Thai patent law authorizes any ministry, bureau or
department of the Government to issue a nonvoluntary licence on various grounds of public
demands. When the licence is sought on that basis, the
State agency does not have to wait for a period of
three or four years as in the case of compulsory
licensing for local working. In line with TRIPS
Article 31(b), Sections 47 and 47 bis of the Thai
Patent Act do not require the prospective licensee to
show that it has attempted but failed to obtain a
voluntary licence from the patentee. The State agency
is required to notify the patentee in writing without
delay after a licence is issued.
Royalty Fees

According to Article 31(h) of the TRIPS
Agreement, the patent holder shall be adequately
compensated, taking into account economic value of
the authorization. The remuneration must be paid in
all cases of non-voluntary licensing. When a
compulsory licence is granted to remedy anticompetitive practices, the authority can determine the
appropriate amount of remuneration by taking into
account the necessity to correct such practices.23
TRIPS, however, does not specify what amount of
remuneration is adequate. The ambiguity of the term
‘adequate remuneration’ allows the granting country
to compulsorily exploit the patent in exchange with
the fee considered by the State to be reasonable.24
Section 51 of Thai Patent Law requires the
licensing authority to offer the amount of
remuneration and conditions for granting of a
compulsory licence to the Director-General of the
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DIP. No guidelines are provided as to what is the
reasonable remuneration. The law only requires both
parties to enter into negotiations to evaluate the rate of
royalty. If the parties fail to reach an agreement
within the period prescribed by the Director-General,
the Director-General will make a decision as to the
royalty and conditions. Parities may appeal the
decision to the Board of Patents, and, further, to the
Court of Intellectual Property and International Trade
Court within sixty days.25 It may be noted that the
patentee can only appeal of the terms of the licence,
but has no right to appeal the grounds for the decision
to grant the licence. The appeal by the patent holder
will not suspend the execution of the order.26 This is
significant to prevent the patentee delaying the
issuance of the licence.
In the United States, the country experienced with
the non-voluntary government use licence, the rate of
adequate remuneration refers to “the amount that a
person desiring to manufacture [or use] a patented
article … would be willing to pay as a royalty and yet
be able to make [or use] the patented article, in the
market at a reasonable profit.”27 Therefore the fees
can be either a fixed sum per unit sold or a percentage
of the net sales price of the product produced by the
licensee (e.g. normally between 1 and 5 per cent).
Other factors are also taken into consideration when a
reasonable royalty is determined: expected volume of
production, price under the non-voluntary licence,
potential market price and profit margin, R&D and
related legal costs, advertising and administrative
expenses, possible substitutes, risks undertaken in
first producing the invention, evidence of bad faith or
anticompetitive practices, etc.
Production for Export

The significance of the compulsory licensing to
improve access to essential medicines may be
minimized when a country does not have capacity to
manufacture required drugs.28 The problem is
exacerbated by the fact that the products cannot be
imported as the newly invented drugs are likely to be
under patent protection in the countries where they
are manufactured. A couple of the TRIPS provisions
permit production for export. First, under Article
31(k), the product produced under a compulsory
licence which is issued to combat anticompetitive
practices may be exported to other countries.
Secondly, TRIPS Article 31(f) stipulates that the use
of a compulsory licence must be made predominantly
for the supply of the domestic market. This can be
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interpreted that less than half of the production
authorized by a compulsory licence can be exported.
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration and the
decisions of the WTO General Council of 2003 and
2005 reaffirm that WTO Members may issue
compulsory licences to produce and export generic
medicines to countries with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector.29
The 2005 Decision also waives the payment
requirement in the eligible importing Member.30
Law of a large number of developing countries
including Thai law still does not make operative to the
decisions adopted by WTO. They may wish to adopt a
provision permitting import of medicines they lack
manufacturing capacity to produce. Countries with
large generic producers like Thailand may consider
incorporating into the national patent law provisions
enabling the export of pharmaceuticals manufactured
under the compulsory licensing.
Revocation of Patents for Non-Working
Since there is no specific TRIPS provision on
forfeiture, any revocation of patents is compatible
with the TRIPS Agreement. Article 5A(3) of the Paris
Convention provides for the forfeiture of a patent,
subject to three minimum requirements. First, when
the owner of a patent supplies the local market
through import, the granting State cannot exercise
the forfeiture power.31 Secondly, the State may
prescribe the forfeiture only after a compulsory
licence has already been granted and such a licence is
inadequate to prevent the non-working of patent.
Thirdly, the forfeiture shall not be applied before the
expiration of two years from the grant of the first
compulsory licence.
The Paris Convention provision is incorporated
into Section 55 of the Thai Patent Act. The conditions
under this provision seem to act as an obstacle for the
use of this legal measure. The requirements make the
forfeiture of patents a secondary remedy and
essentially dependent on the grant of a compulsory
licence. Since the use of compulsory licensing
particularly in most developing countries is almost
non-existent, the absence of the licence, which is a
pre-requisite for the forfeiture, makes the forfeiture of
patents unthinkable.
Parallel Import of Patented Medicines
Parallel import refers to the situation when
products manufactured and sold abroad with the
permission of the right holder are imported by third
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parties into the country without authorization of the
patent holder.32 A number of factors (e.g. taxes,
consumers’ purchasing power, availability of brand
name or generic products, etc.) cause price
differentiation between countries, which create
opportunities for cross border distributor to obtain a
product in a low-price country and ship it to an
unauthorized distributor in a high-price country.33
Many countries currently adopt the so-called
‘international exhaustion’ doctrine, which exclusive
rights are exhausted after the first sale of the patented
article regardless of the place of marketing, thus
permitting parallel import.34 Parallel import is the
most effective and flexible method of enhancing
competition and curtailing the serious restrictions of
patents on prices. Unlike the compulsory licensing
system, the importation right of the third party was
automatic and was not subject to a length of time and
complex granting procedures. The Doha Declaration
clarifies Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement that
Members are free to establish their own regime for
such exhaustion of right without challenge, subject to
National Treatment and Most Favoured Nation
Treatment under TRIPS Articles 3 and 4. Parallel
import, however, can be hindered by other
restrictions, such as, national health and safety
regulation, process of drug registration, restrictive
clauses imposed on the distributor in the country from
which the drug is imported, etc.
Section 36(7) of the Thai Patent Act authorizes
parallel import if the products are marketed abroad by
the patentee or with his consent. However, the law is
unclear if parallel imports could be made from
sources unauthorized by the patentee (e.g. the
producers who manufacture the drugs under a
compulsory licence). In order to make essential
products available in the local market, the law of
developing countries should authorize parallel imports
of patented products that are available in the foreign
market at prices lower than the domestic prices due to
compulsory licensing being granted in that country. It
is equally important that all restrictions to parallel
import be removed.
Patentability of Further Uses of a Known Product
The practice of the national patent office may
affect the country’s accessibility to medicine,
particularly if patenting of trivial inventions is
admissible. Generally, the invention is no longer

patentable when it belongs to the prior art and then
lacks novelty. Some countries’ patent laws make an
exception in favour of the discovery of the new use of
an existing product. Article 54(5) of the European
Patent Convention (EPC), for example, recognizes
patentability of a new medical use of a known
substance (i.e. use of a substance in a surgical,
therapeutic or diagnostic procedure) or a known
mixture of substances, provided that such a use or
mixture has not been known to the public.35
The above provision grants protection to an
invention consisting of previously known substances
for use in a new medical method:36 for example a
claim for product X (a known product) to be used as
an active therapeutic substance (a new medical use).37
This sort of claim, called a ‘purpose-limited product
claim’ (not a use claim), is patentable and not
considered the invention relating to medical treatment
which is excluded from patent protection under
Article 52(4) of the EPC. The essence of this
provision is that a pharmaceutical invention is
afforded dual protection. First, the inventor may assert
either an ‘absolute product claim’ or a ‘product claim
for a particular use’ for a new pharmaceutical product.
If, instead, the substance or composition is known,
then the inventor may defer to general patent law
principles pertaining to ‘use claims’, provided that the
use of such a product in medical way has never been
known before.
To the extent that a single pharmaceutical
substance can have multiple uses, the law, however, is
unclear on the notion of the second and subsequent
use of a known drug. Since the EPC prohibits the
grant of patent when use of the product in ‘any
method’ for the treatment of human and animal body
is not new,38 this implies that when the substance has
been disclosed for use in medical treatment in any
way, further uses of the substance are no longer
patentable. The EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal
considered this issue and ruled in G5/83,
EISAI/Second Medical Indication39 that the second
and subsequent medical use was not patentable as it
was equivalent to the method of treatment of human
and animal body. The Enlarged Board went further by
holding that a claim for a second or further use of ‘a
certain substance or composition for the manufacture
of a medicament for a specified new and inventive
therapeutic application’, the so-called ‘Swiss claim’,
was not included in this exclusion and it could fulfill
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the novelty requirement. This decision was followed
by the courts of the EPC members such as UK court
in John Wyeth and Brother Ltd’s Application.40
Section 9(4) of the Thai Patent Act adopts the
principle that methods for medical treatment are not
patentable. Like the Patent Office of many other
developing countries, the DIP follows the practice of
the EPO by treating first and second indications (i.e. a
new medicinal use of the known substance) as a
product claim, and thus not excluded from patent
protection under Section 9(4) of the Patent Act. This
is so despite the fact that Thai law has no parallel
provision of Article 54(5) of the EPC that provides
special treatment to medical inventions.
Regarding the criteria for patentability, it has to be
taken into account that there are no internationally
agreed criteria to define what constitutes a patentable
invention. Thailand and other developing countries
must preclude the necessity to copy or follow the
procedures that are in place in other countries. They
should make it clear that patents are available for new
medical products or new chemical entities only.
Allowing patentability for the first and subsequent
uses or the new composition of a known drug would
unnecessarily prolong the monopolistic market
enjoyed by the patentee and deprive consumers of the
right to essential medicines. Thailand and other
developing countries should treat ‘first and second
indications’ claims as a method of medical treatment
and therefore non-patentable. It should conceivably
deny a patent for pharmaceutical composition on
grounds of lack of novelty (i.e. being ‘anticipated by
the effective ingredient that it contains’).41
Opposition Proceedings
It is extremely costly for a country to carry out
accurate patent examination. The United States, for
example, spends more than US$ 1 billion per year to
do exhaustive searches of the prior art and to carry out
substantive examination of patent applications. Patent
offices in developing countries do not have sufficient
resources and qualified staff. Its staffs are generally
under-trained and have less access to technological
materials on prior art.42 Thus, it is extremely
important that patent law of those countries provides
for patent challenge proceedings in order to detect an
application’s weaknesses and allow competitors to
oppose the grant of a patent to such an application.
There are two types of opposition proceedings: pregrant and post-grant. The former is the system that
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opposition is considered by the national patent office
during the examination process, and the latter refers to
the proceedings brought by the opponent of a patent
holder before the patent office or the courts. The postgrant procedure comes after the decision on the
examination leading to official grant of the patent and
the opposition is filed to challenge the decision.
Challenging a patent before it is issued is an
administrative process, and is generally faster and
cheaper than post-grant court proceedings. While a
successful opposition in a pre-grant procedure will
prevent the entire issuance of the patent or limit the
scope of the opposed patent claims, the post-grant
patent challenge can result in one of these solutions:
rejection of the opposition, nullifying the granted
patent, and amending the patent.
The TRIPS Agreement is silent on the issue of
procedures for patent opposition. The Japanese law,
the EPC and law of the countries brought in line with
the European Convention (e.g. that of the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden,
Denmark, etc.) provide for a post-grant opposition
procedure.43 The current law of India is unique as it is
the only patent law that provides for both pre- and
post-grant opposition.44The patent systems of most
developing countries seem to prefer a pre-grant
opposition. Section 31 of the Thai Patent Act, for
example, permits oppositions to be filed after the
applications are published. Any person, without
restriction as to their nationality or connections with
the applicant, may initiate proceedings to oppose the
grant of a patent within ninety days from the date of
the publication. There are two reasons on which
oppositions may be based: (1) lack of patentability;
and (2) the applicant is not entitled to file a patent
application. Other grounds likely to affect the validity
of a patent (e.g. insufficient disclosure) cannot be
raised as grounds for opposition under Thai law.
The United States and the European Union are now
pressurizing developing countries to discard their pregrant opposition proceedings.45 Those countries are
very skeptical about the negative effects of such
pre-grant opposition, particularly, the very
considerable delay in achieving the grant of a patent.
Such procedures, they maintain, are unnecessary and
done at the wrong time. Since the only document
available after the date of publication would be the
specification as filed, the person who lodges an
opposition might not be certain as to what exactly he
is opposing.46
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The repeal of the present system for post-grant
opposition may not benefit the developing countries
wishing to increase access to medicines. It will be
much more difficult for the competitor to oppose
patents after grant as the patents are in force while the
opposition litigation is pending. The pre-grant patent
challenge is the best way to limit the number of
granted invalid patents. It provides some form of low
cost administrative procedure for the manufacturers of
generic medicines, who are in a better position to
check a drug’s patentability than the patent office as
they operate in the same field and are aware of the
previous use of the medicine. However, since the pregrant opposition proceedings can be used by third
parties to delay the grant of a patent, it is necessary
that the process is run in a transparent manner. It is
equally important that the process for oppositions is
independent, and fair and equitable to all parties.

maintaining of the pre-grant opposition proceedings
which are conducted by an administrative review.

Conclusion
Given the detailed characteristics of patent systems
relating to pharmaceuticals, it can be asserted that the
implications of pharmaceutical patenting have
strongly
affected
national
socio-economic
development of developing countries. The
achievement of the developing countries in
minimizing the impacts of pharmaceutical patents and
maximizing the benefit of patent protection depends
on the best combination of policies, efficient
administrative system, and effective and appropriate
legislations. The national patent system must be
designed to serve the social, economic and
technological needs of the granting country.

5

It is strongly recommended that the patent law of
developing countries should be revised along this line:
(1) extension of the objectives of the patent law to
reflect objectives and principles of intellectual
property protection as stipulated under TRIPS
Articles 7 and 8; (2) clarification of rules of novelty
and inventive step so as to prohibit claims to trivial
inventions such as a new use of existing substances
and a new indication or formulation; (3) strengthening
and implementing provisions of compulsory
licensing, government use, and parallel import; (4)
incorporating national law provisions enabling import
and export of pharmaceuticals produced under a
compulsory licence in line with the Doha Declaration
and the WTO Decisions; (5) adopting and
implementing guidelines for non-voluntary licensing
procedures and on remuneration; (6) adoption and
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